I’m teaching tonight, 9-11pm on Zoom on Heidegger and Art. Sign up here.
Last week I wrote about the conflicting notions of “equality” underlying the liberal project.
Another way to put the problem is that the abstract assertion of fundamental equality between people is belied by all kinds of empirical data and phenomenological experience to the contrary.
People are unequal in perhaps an infinite number of ways, not just on the familiar axes of wealth or status, talent or desirability, but also on more hidden (interior) axes like self-worth, mental wellbeing, purposiveness, joie de vivre. While socio-economics puts an average price on everything, there is no end to the way that we, on a micro-level, can value things differently from our family, friends, neighbors, and enemies; this includes a person’s meta-capacity to ignore or even eschew things which society deems valuable and to esteem things which society overlooks or castigates.
Given the preponderance of ways that people are unequal, and, indeed, unequal by virtue of being individual and incommensurate, assertions of equality will take one of two forms. Either they will be aspirational: empirical manifestations of inequality are something bad to be fixed, in accordance with some sense of “fairness.” Or, they will be descriptive, but abstract: equality of opportunity, an equal right to life, to vote, to express oneself, etc.
In Political theory, the abstract form of equality is the conceptual correlate to “Formal democracy.” Formal democracy can mean a majoritarian tyranny. But “substantive democracy,” which is the notion that democracy should guarantee more than just empty rights is often used to undermine “Formal democracy.” Thus, one can always be an enemy of (formal) democracy in the name of (substantive) democracy. The reason is that what the people want is not always the same as what the people ought to want. Or rather, the “we” in “We the people” is often conflicted, just as we ourselves are often conflicted.
The assertion of human equality predates liberal democracy. Augustinians know the equality of souls by virtue of the mark of original sin. Stoics know that souls are equal by virtue of their inability to control fate (environment). Long have thinkers observed that no person, great or small, can opt out of not having been born; nor can she opt out of having to die.
Herodotus says there is only one moment in life that counts and it is the moment for death. Death is the ultimate equalizer. And yet, for Spartan warriors, the only great moment in life is the moment of dying. This is the moment where one proves oneself to have lived a glorious life.
If the Spartans are right, then we should be up in arms about the fact that so few today have a good death. What would an Occupy movement involve that protested the 1% of people dying gloriously, as opposed to everyone else? But in seriousness, we can see from just one example that every abstraction which promises equality also becomes the basis for inequality.
The founding metaphysical principles of liberal democracy are under-theorized. More than that, they are often at odds with our experience of the world, and our sense of what makes for a good life. While pragmatists might wave their hands and say we should ignore this made-up problem, I contend that we as individuals and as members of society would be better off if we grappled with the ways in which pure egalitarianism is both impossible and undesirable.
The primary question is what kinds of inequality are we willing to tolerate and even celebrate, and what kinds of inequality are we willing to forbid and condemn? And the secondary question is who the “we” is who decides this, and what should be done in the case of a near 50-50 split on such a basic question?
What is Called Thinking? is a practice of asking a daily question on the belief that self-reflection brings awe, joy, and enrichment to one’s life. Consider becoming a paying subscriber to support this project and access subscriber-only content.
You can read my weekly Torah commentary here.