Do We Need a Definition of "Human" To Defend Human Rights?
Richard Rorty vs. Paul Bloom on Empathy and Moral Education
The concept of human rights presupposes that we can distinguish between the human and the non-human. Yet, human rights violations often occur precisely because one group has first dehumanized another. People don’t see themselves as perpetrating an indignity against other human beings as such; rather, they see themselves as defending the principle of humanity by attacking those they see as as inhuman. A core reason human rights can be upheld in name, but not practice, is that “dehumanization” precedes the infringement of human rights. (We will bracket for another time a discussion of Samuel Moyn’s yet more trenchant critique of human rights.)
A few weeks ago I wrote in defense of virtue ethics. Some of the criticisms I mentioned there—that virtue ethics is not sufficiently directive, goal-oriented, or objective—can also be advanced from a human rights perspective. Virtue ethics tells us that we should cultivate good habits; it says little about society’s obligations to the worst off.
Yet if the problem with human rights is primarily one of experience—if the bottle-neck, in other words, is at the level of perceiving the other as human—then virtue ethics is of supreme importance as it becomes the basis on which we might realize the abstract dream of human rights.
This, as I understand it, is the contribution of the pragmatist philosopher, Richard Rorty in his “Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality.” Rorty is a non-foundationalist, meaning he doesn’t believe we can ground our normative views in first principles. How, then, can we defend human rights? True to his pragmatist spirit, he argues that we shouldn’t worry about defending the principle of human rights so much as we should worry about cultivating empathy for one another through what Adam Smith called “a sentimental education.” Humanities can play a role, he argues, in helping us expand our circle of empathy (Narrator voice: reader, this premise is dubious and self-serving.)
Whether you agree with the details of Rorty’s argument or not, he offers a provocative response to the claim that human rights are incoherent without a strong metaphysical and/or religious foundation (that most modern adherents to human rights doctrine haven’t considered and wouldn’t accept).
A strong counter to Rorty is Paul Bloom’s argument in Against Empathy, that empathy a) clouds thoughtful decision making, leading to unintended harm b) is highly selective and biased and c) is unable to guide decision making when faced with competing claims for empathy.
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