Can We Fail Someone Who Doesn’t Yet Exist?

This is the question that came to mind while reading Ross Douthat’s argument that our social norms contracept more children from being born.

The rights of the non-existent are slightly different than those of the not-yet-existent. The latter will exist, while the former may or may not.

The question of our responsibility to bring life into the world is different from what we owe future generations, since the latter posits future generations exist while the former raises the question of whether they should.

To put it philosophically, there is a difference between fulfilling a given potential and creating new potential (which we can call the potential for potentiality itself).

Perhaps there is no solid obligation towards what may or may not be—and yet we need a way of talking about the phenomenon that isn’t simply the equivalent of throwing our hands up in the air.

How do you think about your responsibility to something whose existence can only come about through your sense of responsibility for it?